We present the basic framework of a logic of actions and plans de ned in terms of modal logic combined with a notion of dependence. The latter is used as a weak causal connection between actions and literals. In this paper we focus on the frame problem and demonstrate how it can be solved in our framework in a simple and monotonic way. We give the semantics, and associate an axiomatics and a decision procedure to it. The decision procedure is based on a sound and complete tableau method with single step rules to treat dependence. We show how it can be used to generate plans. Our solution is formally assessed by a translation of Gelfond and Lifschitz' logic A. We brie y sketch the second part of the paper, showing how we can go beyond A by some examples involving nondeterminism and rami cations.
there has been done a lot of both theoretical and implementation work in particular on tableau theorem provers for modal logics. In this way we get an alternative to the existing automated methods of reasoning about actions, which mainly rely on either logic programming or circumscription.
Our basic logic, the logic of action and plans (LAP), is slightly simpler than PDL. It is a propositional multimodal logic, with a modal operator ] for every atomic action , and a supplementary modal operator 2 which is used to represent laws, i.e. formulas that are true in every situation. 2 corresponds to the always connective in AR and AR 0 . The dual modal operator of possibility 3 allows to express goals in plan generation tasks. Basically, the logic of each ] is the modal logic K, while that of 2 is S4. 2 interacts with every ] in the sense that 2A ! ]A. The language of LAP is conceptually simpler than that of PDL, but it is su cient to express most of the problems that have been investigated in the eld.
The only connective of A that is lacking in LAP is causes. In A, if causes A holds then for every possible state of the world, A holds after the execution of in that state. What is involved here is quanti cation over possible states. This aspect of the meaning of causes can be captured in LAP by means of the 2 operator: if causes A then we have 2 ]A. But the LAP formula 2 ]A translates only part of the meaning of causes A. The other aspect of the semantics of causes basically is that the execution of does not change the truth values of all those atomic formulas not occurring in any causes statement for . This is the way the frame problem is solved in A. Indeed, this aspect could be captured in LAP by an appropriate set of formulas of the form 2(B ! ]B). But we clearly do not want to write down such frame axioms. Hence the frame problem puts the same type of di culties in LAP as in the situation calculus. Our solution is di erent from the one adopted in the A-family, and is somewhat closer in spirit to Sandewall's Features and Fluents framework 54], and related concepts. 2 We use an independence relation 6 ; between actions and literals: 6 ;L is read \L is independent of ", or \ may not cause L".
In other words, if L has truth value false, it remains false after execution of . This means that we represent a frame axiom 2(:L ! ]:L) by 6 ;L. But it follows from the principle of inertia that, for a given action, the number of literals that it does not a ect is big. On the other hand, the number of literals a ected by that action is small. Hence we shall not represent the independence relation itself, but its complement, the dependence relation ; between actions and literals (which can be supposed to be small). Now, given a dependence relation ;, we integrate it into LAP, resulting in a new dependence-based logic LAP ; . Its models are those models of LAP satisfying a single dependence-based condition, saying that if the execution of action in a possible world (situation) w leads to world w 0 , then for every literal L such that 6 ;L, if L is false in w then L is false in w 0 . In this way, we marry modal logic and dependence relations. We give a Hilbert style axiomatic system for that semantics, and show that standard proof-theoretic results for modal logics transfer in a straightforward way. We focus on theorem proving techniques, in particular tableau proof procedures. (We note that our solution could be used in the situation calculus as well, but technical results { in particular decidability { would be more di cult to obtain.)
The rest of the paper is as follows: in section 2 we de ne our object language, and in sections 3 and 4 we present the basic logic LAP. In this logic the frame problem is not solved. In order to solve it, we introduce the notion of dependence, and for each dependence relation ; we obtain a new logic LAP ; . This family of logics is presented in section 5. In section 6 we give a sound and complete tableau method with special stepback and stepforward rules. We present in section 7 an application of the tableau method in plan generation tasks. LAP ; is assessed in section 8, where we show a sound and complete translation from the logic A into LAP ; . In section 9 we go beyond A and discuss some important points such as rami cations and nondeterminism. These latter points are treated in detail in the second part of this paper.
Language and notation
In our object language we have a family of operators ], where is the name of an atomic action, plus a single non-indexed operator 2 that is used to write action laws as well as static laws.
Let ACT = f ; ; : : :g be the set of atomic actions (like \load" and \shoot"), and let ATM = fP; Q; : : :g be the set of atomic formulas, or just atoms (like \Loaded" and \Alive"). Both sets may be in nite. The set LIT = fL; L 1 ; : : :g of literals is made up of all atoms and their negations. The set FOR of formulas is de ned in the usual way as the smallest set such that We read ]A as \A holds after the execution of action ", 2A as \A is always true". In particular, ]? means that is not executable. A formula without modal operators is classical.
We use _; !; $; as usual ( is the exclusive or). h iA abbreviates : ]:A and 3A abbreviates :2:A. h i> means that is executable. 3A will be useful for planning: we read 3A as \there is a plan to bring about A". We also make use of some constructions familiar from dynamic logic as \do either or nondeterministically", ; as \do followed by ". With \ ", \;", \ ", \?" we can thus construct complex actions that we call plans. We identify nite sets of formulas with the conjunction of its elements. 3 What is reasoning about actions?
In this section we state the terminology of reasoning about actions in terms of the above modal language. We illustrate our language and our logic throughout the paper by the classical Yale shooting scenario 27].
Belief bases, queries, and domain laws
We can describe in our modal language three main concepts: knowledge bases, queries, and domain laws.
Knowledge bases (KB) expresses that the action forcewalk can never be executed after shoot if the gun is loaded.
Main problems
If we try to reason about actions in a logical system, three main problems arise:
1. The frame problem 47] is that the overwhelming part of the dynamic laws are frame axioms, due to the hypothesis of inertia. For example after the action of loading the gun, the man is still alive. 46 ] is that it is di cult to write down executability laws. The reason is that the number of preconditions of an action is huge (e.g., the preconditions of the action of starting a car). Moreover, it may be undesirable or practically infeasible to check the truth of each of them. It is usually considered that we should derive the executability of an action by default, i.e., in the absence of information contradicting its executability. Hence mechanisms of nonmonotonic inference are mandatory here. In this paper we mainly focus on the frame problem. Part II will be dedicated to the rami cation problem. We stress that, contrarily to the quali cation problem, these two problems do not require a priori nonmonotonic inference systems. Our solution will be monotonic, leaving the way open for a solution to the quali cation problem by the addition of nonmonotonic features.
A basic modal logic of actions and plans
In this section we present the logic of actions and plans LAP, which is a normal multimodal logic made up with a family of operators ], where is the name of an atomic action, plus a single non-indexed operator 2. The logic of each ] is the basic modal logic K, while that of 2 is S4. 2 Consider a scenario where wait, load and shoot represent the actions of waiting, loading and shooting. Let the atoms Loaded and Alive represent \the gun is loaded" and \the man is alive". The e ect of the load action is that the gun is loaded, and the e ects of the shoot action are that the gun is unloaded and that the person is killed if the gun is loaded. This action has no e ect if the gun is unloaded. The wait action has no e ect at all. Initially, the gun is unloaded and the man is alive. In LAP this scenario is written as: Theorem 4 In LAP, the problem of satis ability is EXPTIME-complete. 3 Proof See appendix A.
Discussion
Our language is similar to that of PDL. For the sake of comparison, suppose that the set of atomic actions is nite, and that ACT = f 1 ; : : :; n g. 2A This makes a di erence only if we want to go beyond the reasoning tasks of prediction and planning, and prove liveliness properties, as done e.g. in GOLOG 35] . Consider an action theory with only one action , containing an e ect law 2 ]P, and let P hold. Then it would follow from the induction axiom that 2P holds, while in LAP it is not possible to prove that static law.
The original raison d'être of the PDL -operator is to model loop sentences of computer programs. In what concerns reasoning about actions, it is certainly useful if we want to construct complex plans involving iterations (see e.g. 13, 35] ), and might be considered in future elaborations of our approach. Our weaker 2 operator has some advantages: 3 As pointed out to us by an anonymous referee, even if we consider the fragment of the language containing just e ect and executability laws as de ned in section 3, LAP continues to be EXPTIME-complete. This can be established via the correspondence between description logics and propositionaldynamic logics 55, 12] . Using static laws of the form 2A, where A is a classical formula, and dynamic laws of the form 2(P ! ]Q) and 2(P ! h i>), where P; Q are atomic propositions, it is possible to encode the description logic ALU + Axioms, which is EXPTIME-complete 5].
LAP is compact and strongly complete, while PDL is not. (This follows from theorem 43 in appendix B.) A tableau method can be de ned straightforwardly by combining the tableau rules for the logics K and S4. We omit a presentation here, because it is a particular case of the method presented in section 6 (see 9] for details).
Note nevertheless that we have established by the above theorem 4 that LAP and PDL still have the same theoretical complexity.
The proof of the complexity result uses that deductions with global assumptions in modal logic K can be mapped into LAP proofs. Indeed, formulas such as e ect and static laws (which are both of the form 2A) behave just as global assumptions in deductions. (This corresponds to a well-known property of modal logic S4, viz.
A`B i `2A ! B.) We have preferred the introduction of 2 over deduction with global assumptions, because 2 permits to express more complex laws, such as so-called immutable propositions (cf. section 2), and most importantly goals.
We could have given to our modal operator 2 the semantics of the universal modality 48]. The latter has the truth condition j = w 2A i 8w 0 2 W : j = w 0 A This means that the accessibility relation associated to R 2 is universal: R 2 = W W. It has been shown in 48] that such an operator has the logic S5. Given that the accessibility relation property modally de ned by S5 is that of R 2 being an equivalence relation, it follows that the universal accessibility relation is not modally de nable: there is no modal formula able to force every possible world to be accessible. In our case, as we do not consider converse actions, a`forward-looking' universal modality is su cient for our purposes. Indeed, it is more convenient here e.g. because it permits to express immutable propositions by 2(:Alive ! 2:Alive), or something like irreversible actions, such as 2(Loaded ! shoot]2:Walking).
As expected, to e ectively reason about actions and plans in LAP is di cult due to the huge number of frame axioms. In other words, within LAP, the frame problem is unsolved. In 13] there is a monotonic solution to the frame problem in the style of 50] and others, using converse and complement of actions, but we shall present in the next section another monotonic solution to the frame problem that is based on the notion of dependence.
Modal logic plus dependence
How can we adapt LAP to solve the frame problem? In this section we present our solution in terms of a dependence relation between actions and literals. L depends on means that may cause L, i.e., after the execution of , L may become true.
We constrain models of LAP by a dependence-based condition saying that whenever L is independent of , the falsehood of L is preserved under R .
Dependence relations
Our solution to the frame problem is based on the following considerations: suppose we have a complete description of a domain, containing all e ect laws, in particular all frame axioms. For every action and literal L, whenever there is a frame axiom 2(L ! ]L) then the execution of cannot ip L from true to false, in any situation. In this case we say that may not cause :L, or :L is independent of . (Note that we need the hypothesis here that all frame axioms operate on literals. This hypothesis is implicit in all the formalisms in the literature. We were unable to nd examples where frame axioms on conjunctions or disjunctions appear in a natural way.) The set of such pairs ( ; L) makes up an independence relation between actions and literals. Then we drop all those frame axioms. We thus have replaced the huge number of frame axioms by a huge independence relation: the hypothesis of inertia says that \almost all" of the literals L are independent of a given action . On the other hand, it is reasonable to expect that the dependence relation (the complement of the independence relation) is much smaller that the independence relation. So, the trick is to represent the independence relation by the dependence relation.
With this motivation, we are ready for the de nition of dependence.
De nition 5 A dependence relation is a binary relation between actions and literals ; ACT LIT. The complement of ; is noted 6 ; and is called an independence relation.
It will be convenient to understand ;::P as ;P.
When we write ;L we want to say: \ may cause L", and this expresses that the execution of action may change the truth value of L from false to true. For example shoot;:Alive: there is a state of a airs (viz. when the gun is loaded) where the execution of shoot ips the truth value of :Alive from false to true.
Hence our dependence notion does not cause change, but it only allows change. This is similar in spirit to Sandewall's occlusion, and di erent from other causalitybased approaches such as those of 39, 44] .
Note that ; is not in the object language, but in the metalanguage. In the next section we show how dependence ts into the modal framework.
Semantics of LAP ;
Suppose some dependence relation is given. In order to satisfy our intuitions, we must restrict our LAP-models in the following way: suppose that we are in a particular situation (alias possible world) w where P does not hold. First, suppose ;P is the case. Then we know that the execution of may cause P, but we don't know whether it will do so this time. Hence both are possible: the execution of may lead to a situation where P continues to be false, but it may as well lead to a situation where P becomes true. Now suppose 6 ;P is the case. Then we know that the execution of may never make P true. Therefore the execution of will leave P false.
De nition 6 Let ; be a dependence relation. A model for LAP ; (a LAP ; -model) is a LAP-model = hW; fR : 2 ACTg; R 2 ; i, such that whenever wR w 0 then we have for every : 6 ;P and w 6 2 (P) implies w 0 6 2 (P); 6 ;:P and w 2 (P) implies w 0 2 (P). In this way, a LAP ; -model is just a LAP-model with a supplementary condition to deal with dependence between actions and literals: if may not cause L then the execution of leaves unchanged the truth value of L.
Given a dependence relation ;, we say that A is LAP ; -valid (noted j = LAP ; A) if A is true in all LAP ; -models. Remark 7 In the case where ; = ACT LIT, the set of LAP ; -models is exactly the set of LAP-models. In the other extreme (and less interesting) case where ; = ;, actions have no e ects and the models collapse: they only contain a single world. The independence wait6 ;:Loaded warrants that the gun remains loaded after waiting.
Axiomatics and theoretical complexity of LAP ;
For a given dependence relation ;, we axiomatize the class of LAP ; -models by the axiomatics of LAP, plus a dependence-based axiom schema
Theorem 9 For every dependence relation ;, the axiomatics of LAP ; is sound and complete w.r.t. the class of LAP ; -models.
Proof See appendix B. Theoretical complexity of LAP ; is the same as that of LAP: Theorem 10 In LAP ; , the problem of satis ability is EXPTIME-complete. Proof LAP is just LAP ; with ; = ;. Hence the complexity of LAP ; is at least EXPTIME. To establish the upper bound we exhibit a polynomial transformation t from LAP ; to LAP. Let Indep(A; ) be the set of those independences occurring in A, i.e. Indep(A; ) = f( ; L) : and L appear in A, and 6 ;Lg. Note that Indep(A; ) is nite, and that its size is quadratic in the size of A. Then
We note in passing that this also illustrates that the frame problem has nothing to do with theoretical complexity.
6 Tableaux for LAP ;
In this section we present a tableau proof procedure for LAP ; .
The rst tentative of solution is to add to the LAP-tableau rules a new rule that takes into account the semantics of the dependence relation when a new node is generated: whenever L is in some node of the tableau, if 6 ;:L, then put the literal L in all worlds accessible from that node via . We call this the \stepforward"-rule.
But this is not enough: suppose, for example, that 6 ;P and 6 ;:P, for some atom P and actions ; . Then the formula h iP^h i:P is LAP ; -unsatis able, but the above rule is not su cient to make the tableau close. Our solution is to add a special \stepback"-rule, which permits to propagate independent literals backwards. 4 Such a rule is somewhat opposed to the usual top-dawn tableau construction (which mirrors Gentzen's sequent calculi). For a more general application of stepback rules see 43, 6] . The tableau calculus we are about to present is based on labelled formulas. We begin with some terminology:
De nition 11 A labelled formula is a pair (n; A), where A is a formula and n is an Elements ( ; n; n 0 ) of the relation are noted n ! n 0 . De nition 13 A tree 6 is a pair hS; i, where S is a set of labelled formulas and is a skeleton.
Tableau rules applicable to hS; i rule ?: If S contains (n; A) and (n; :A), then add (n; ?) to it. rule :: If S contains (n; ::A), then add (n; A) to it. rule^: If S contains (n; A^B), then add (n; A) and (n; B) to it. rule _: If S contains (n; :(A^B)), then add (n; :A) to it, and add hS f(n;:B)g; i to C i+1 . rule K : If S contains (n; ]A), and contains n ! n 0 , then add (n 0 ;A) to it. rule T2: If S contains (n; 2A), then add (n;A) to it. rule 42: If S contains (n; 2A), and contains n 2 ! n 0 or n ! n 0 for some 2 ACT, then add (n 0 ;2A) to it. rule h i: If S contains (n; : ]A), then add (n 0 ;:A) to it, and add n ! n 0 to , where n 0 is a fresh integer. rule 3: If S contains (n; :2A), then add (n 0 ; :A) to it and add n 2 ! n 0 to , where n 0 is a fresh integer.
rule SF: If S contains (n;L), where L is a literal, and n ! n 0 2 , and 6 ;:L, then add (n 0 ; L) to it. rule SB: If S contains (n 0 ; L), where L is a literal, and n ! n 0 2 , and 6 ;L, then add (n; L) to it. De nition 14 A tableau for A is the limit 7 of a sequence C 0 ; : : :; C n ; : : : of forests (i.e., sets of trees) where the initial C 0 = fhf0; Ag; ;ig, and every C i+1 is obtained from C i by applying one of the tableau rules of gure 1 to some tree hS; i 2 C i . 8 This limit is noted C 1 .
Note that for each tree hS; i in that forest, all the sets are downward closed in Remark 16 The last two rules SF and SB are associated with the dependence relation: literals whose negation is independent of an action remain unchanged when is executed. Let us recall that in a LAP ; -model, if (wR w 0 and may not cause :L ( i.e., if 6 ;:L) then L is true at w implies that L must be true at w 0 , too (this is rule SF); and conversely, if 6 ;L then L is true at w 0 implies that L must be true at w, too (this is rule SB).
Remark 17 As said in the introduction of this section, without the stepback rule SB there is no closed tableau for the unsatis able formula h iP^h i:P if 6 ;P and 6 ;:P. Hence SB is necessary for completeness. But SB seems to be useless in almost all practical problems (and in particular in the standard examples), the reason Proof See appendix C.1. Theorem 21 (Soundness) If all tableaux for A are closed then A is unsatis able. 9 The information common to all the trees of the tableau is factorized for the sake of clarity (in particular, the common part of the skeletons). We denote \add (n; n 0 ) to " by n ! n 0 in the`skeletons'-column. Note how Loaded is transported when rule SF is applied in line 8 due to wait6 ;:Loaded.
Proof See appendix C.2. Remark 22 (Termination and decidability) As the formulas generated by the tableau rules are subformulas of the initial formula, there is a nite number of distinct states. Using a loop test as for S4 18] we can associate to our initial tableau a nite tableau from which a nite model can be extracted.
Plan generation
Suppose that 3G is some query (or goal), and suppose that we can prove (KBL AW) ! 3G. Our reading of the 3-operator being that there exists a plan to achieve G, we shall justify that claim in the present section by constructing a complex action such that`L AP ; (KB^LAW) ! h iG. This is not always possible. The reason is that the accessibility relation R 2 associated to 2 may be bigger than ( S 2ACT R ) (see the discussion in section 4.3). Intuitively, if there is some negative occurrence of the 2-operator, then one can \jump" to another world without identifying any speci c action. (This would be a`magic action'.) We shall show that this cannot be the case if KB and LAW are of a particular form. What we need are formulas that do not contain negative occurrences of the 2-operator: if all the transitions in tableaux are only triggered by : ] (and not by :2), then a plan can be found by the composition of all actions that have been applied from the initial node to some closed node. This fragment is large enough for our reasoning tasks: there is no negative occurrence of 2 in the categories of knowledge bases and domain laws de ned in section 3. This gives supplementary support to our claim that the *-operator of PDL is not needed for the standard tasks in reasoning about actions and plans. Let fhS 1 ; 1 i; hS 2 ; 2 i; : : :; hS n ; n ig be a closed tableau for KB^LAW^2:G.
(Remember that the tableau construction is nite.) Hence every tree in the tableau is closed. First of all we eliminate all those trees that can be closed without involving a subformula of 2:G. For each of the remaining trees fhS i1 ; i1 i; : : :; hS in ; in ig we extract a nite path from the root to some closed node. This is the plan associated to that tree. Then the plan associated to the tableau is the nondeterministic choice i1 : : : im of all these plans.
Example 23 (The YSS, part IV)
With LAW and KB of example 19, we can as well prove that j = LAP ; (KB^LAW) ! 3:Alive; i.e., there exists a plan to achieve :Alive. The shortest proof of that gives us the plan = load; shoot. The plan 0 = load; wait; shoot corresponds to a longer proof.
Example 24 (Nondeterministic plans)
Let Up mean that some switch is up, and let toggle be an action described by This is an example of a nondeterministic plan. Generally, such plans seem to be of little use, because they do not allow us to e ectively act in order to obtain the goal. Nevertheless it is possible to generate a deterministic plan from the tableau by generating an if-then-else construction when rule (_) is applied: thus the plan if Up then else toggle can be found for the above example. This has been done in 7] . In this view, the plan our algorithm returns can be considered a rst step towards the construction of a more elaborated plan. We shall not go into the details here.
Note also that in the above examples, the plan has been associated to the shortest tableau proof. There might be longer ones, which give us longer plans, such as 0 = load; wait; shoot or 00 = load; wait; shoot; wait in the rst YSS example, and 0 = toggle (toggle; toggle) in the second example.
Theorem 25 Let neither KB nor LAW nor :G contain negative occurrences of 2. Let KB^LAW^2:G be LAP ; -unsatis able, and let be a plan that has been found by the plan generation algorithm. Then KB^LAW^ ]:G is LAP ; -unsatis able. Proof The proof is done by replacing 2:G by ]:G in the tableau. Then the same sequence of tableau rules as in the original tableau can be applied, and we can prove by induction that the latter leads again to a closed tableau. The only non-trivial case is that of rule (_) decomposing S = f(n; :(A^B))g S 0 into S 1 = f(n; :A)g S 0 and S 2 = f(n; :B)g S 0 . Both of these trees must be closed. Remark 26 The size of the translation is linear in the cardinality of EP VP. 10 Satisfaction is understood here as satisfaction in classical logic. 11 Without (a), there could be a LAP;-model for the translation of fP after ; :P after g although it is A-false for all and v. Liberatore 36] Note that in A nothing is stated about the wait action. Hence wait6 ;L for every literal L. But, as in A all actions are executable, we must add 2hwaiti> to LAW.
Thus we have the same set of dependences and domain laws as introduced in example 8.
The formula (KB^LAW) ! hloadihwaitihshooti(:Loaded^:Alive) is valid in LAP ; .
Discussion
We have formally assessed our solution to the frame problem w.r.t. Gelfond and Lifschitz' action logic A. In this section we go beyond and brie y discuss the main characteristics of our approach and compare with previous work. Suppose all you are told about some action is that it always has e ect P if A holds. This is written 2(A ! ]P) in our modal language. What do you conclude about the execution of in situations where :A holds? There are two possibilities:
Monotonic solution
You do not conclude anything. You conclude that P can never be caused by in this case, i.e. you conclude 2((:A^:P) ! ]:P).
The second possibility relies on a particular hypothesis, that has been called`explanation closure assumption' in Reiter's approach 50]. Indeed, his explanation closure axiom (:F(x; s)^F(x; do(a; s))) ! + F (x; a; s) can be put into the form of a conditional frame axiom: (: + F (x; a; s)^:F(x; s) ! :F(x; do(a; s))).
So we could automatically generate such axioms in a way similar to Reiter's. We chose not to build that in our logic, but rather to add conditional frame axioms`by hand' in order to get a more exible framework. In particular we think that our account is better suited when there are indeterminate and indirect e ects. In the second part of the paper we shall study algorithms to semi-automatically compute conditional frame axioms.
The next example is a sibling of Sandewall's Russian Turkey Scenario. It illustrates that our choice is adequate at least in domains with incomplete knowledge, where the explanation closure assumption cannot be made. 
Executability laws
Our solution forces us to add executability laws. (Consider e.g. example 8, 2hwaiti>, 2hloadi> and 2hshooti> explicitly appeared as domain laws.) We just recall that many approaches in the domain adopt the same solution, in particular, the situation calculus based approach of Reiter and colleagues, with their predicate Poss. On the other hand, it might be desirable to automatically generate executability laws. This was done before, e.g. by Lifschitz, minimizing the predicate Precond 37] . It amounts to assume that actions are maximally executable, as done explicitly in 21] . Under this hypothesis we can automatically generate executability laws from the static laws in conjunction with action laws. This will be explored in the second part of the paper.
Indirect e ects
Dependence is a weak causal connection between actions and literals. We are thus close to causality-based approaches to the rami cation problem. We refer here to recent work, where causality was formalized by means of a Our account of the frame problem in terms of dependence is closely related with Haas and Schubert's explanation closure approach: if we look at dependence from right to left, then we can deduce that the only action that can ip the value of Alive from true to false is the action shoot. In this sense, the criticisms of Schubert's work also apply to ours.
One indication that things must be done in this way is the fact that approaches that automatically generate the explanation closure only apply to restricted classes of action theories. For example, Reiter's approach 50] is limited to domains with only deterministic actions without rami cation, while that of Doherty and colleagues 15] is limited to domains without rami cation (allowing thus for indeterminate e ects).
Another argument is that explicit indirect dependences allow to handle examples which turn out to be problematic for other approaches to the rami cation problem, as illustrated in the sequel.
Example 32 (Forcing a door)
We consider two actions, with the same e ect of opening a door. The rst action open has the implicit quali cation 20, 41] that the door must not be barricaded (by say a cupboard). However, the second action force is stronger, in the sense that it always opens the door, even if it is barricaded. In this latter case, the action has the indirect e ect of unblocking the door. It is object of ongoing work how to generate dependence in a semi-automatic way, by means of an interactive preprocessing algorithm. This will come in the second part of this paper.
Indeterminate e ects
Dependence is similar to the notions releases and possibly changes in AR 22] and AR 0 33]. The latter are action logics extending A in particular in order to handle indirect e ects of actions. 13 The o cial reading of releases P and possibly changes P is \when is performed then uent p is exempted from the law of inertia". If we take this serious then it seems that causes P should in general entail releases P and possibly changes P. But this is not the case in these logics 14 , and this is one of the di erences with our dependence notion: in our case the law 2 ]P in general comes with ;P.
In our view, it is the complexity of the minimization-based semantics of AR 0 and AR which made counterexamples possible: AR 0 fails to give the intended solution to Lin's suitcase example, and both AR 0 and AR fail to handle Thielscher's relay example 61]. We are convinced that due to its simplicity our account will better resist to counterexamples.
How can we deal with indeterminate e ects of actions in LAP ; ? Consider the action toss of tossing a coin, whose result is either Heads or Tails. We might consider that in any situation both outcomes are actual possibilities. I.o.w. it is always the case that the result of toss might be Heads, and that it might be Tails. Then we should describe toss by the dynamic law 2(htossiHeads^htossiTails). This view will not be suitable here, because it does not allow us to add observations. Indeed, suppose we have observed that toss has been executed, and that Heads showed up. If we tried to represent this by htossiHeads, we would add something which is already entailed by the laws, and if we tried toss]Heads then this would be inconsistent with htossiTails under the standard reading of the modal operator together with the obvious static law 2:(Heads^Tails). But can we be sure that Tails is a possible outcome in any case? If we take a determinist's position (or at least admit it) we should allow for situations where Heads is the only possible outcome. Then we should rather describe our action by the laws 2 toss](Heads _ Tails) and 2htossi>.
This allows us to add the observation toss]Heads in a non-trivial way. 15 
Example 34 (Spinning and tossing a coin 2])
Suppose a coin is spun on a chessboard. Let Black mean that the coin touches a black square, and White that it touches a white square. After the spinning action the coin may touch either a white square, or a black, or both. ; = spin;Black; spin;:Black; spin;White; spin;:White ; LAW = f2hspini>; 2 spin](Black _ White)g:
Compare this to the action of tossing a coin (which can be seen as spinning a particular coin of surface 0). In this case, we keep ; and just replace in LAW the inclusive disjunction _ by an exclusive one: LAW = f2 toss](Black White)g:
In the literature of the use of disjunctions to represent indeterminate e ects have been criticized (see e.g. 4]): consider the above toss-a-coin example, but suppose the language contains only the atom Heads (and not Tails). In this scenario, so the argument goes, we can only write down tautologous e ect laws of the form 2 toss](Heads _ :Heads). This does not apply to LAP ; because dependence gives us another linguistic tool to express indeterminate e ects, as demonstrated above.
In fact, there is a third option for the representation of indeterminate e ects, viz. to view actions with indeterminate e ects as nondeterministic actions that are obtained from simpler actions by the operator of nondeterministic choice . This is closer to the standard dynamic logic account of nondeterministic programs. (This is also the way Reiter proposes to integrate indeterminate e ects into GOLOG.) Such a representation is possible in LAP ; as well. Consider e.g. the above action of spinning a coin on a chessboard. spin is viewed as being identical to spin 1 The example illustrates that in order to treat indeterminate indirect e ects of an action in LAP ; the only thing we must add are the indirect dependences of .
We note that in other approaches such as 45, 40, 22] , one also must state the indirect dependences explicitly in order to solve this example.
Conclusion
We have presented a monotonic solution to the frame problem which allows for actions with indeterminate and indirect e ects. It is a modal framework with a simple semantics, an axiomatics and a decision procedure based on a simple tableau theorem prover, where we can express indeterminate and indirect e ects of actions. Neither of these characteristics is novel alone, but as far as we know no approach in the literature unites all of them. Modal logics (viz. PDL and extensions of it) have been used before 13, 52, 59]. In 59] frame axioms are computed in a way similar to our construction of dependence relations. Di erent monotonic solutions to the frame problem in the style of 50] and others are given in 13], using converse and complement of actions. Also, in 42], another formalism to reason about programs is used.
In what concerns dependence, similar notions of weak causality have been presented in the literature in the last ve years to handle indeterminate and indirect e ects of actions. In fact, our distinction between dependent and independent literals can be seen as a generalization of that between frame and non-frame uents as proposed in 38], in the sense that we parametrize it by actions. Thielscher's relay example in 60] is an argument for such a generalization. As we have already pointed out in sections 1 and 9.5, our notion is similar to occluded 54] and releases and possibly changes 33, 22] .
In relation with indirect e ects of actions, causality is widely considered to be a fundamental concept, that has been used in 25, 39, 44, 60] , among others. The analysis in 61] was deepened in section 9 by the observation that the in uence of a uent may depend on the context (example 32). Also, we have shown the need of action-indexed causation beyond the framework in 45] (example 33). These two examples cannot be solved with the notions of causality of the other approaches.
In the reasoning about actions community, only little attention has been paid up to now to mechanical proof procedures. By and large, the existing ones are either based on circumscriptive theorem provers 34, 25, 14] or on logic programming languages 19, 35, 51] . The former approaches use algorithms reducing second order logic to rst order. While this is not possible in any case, Gustafsson and Doherty 25] have identi ed a fragment of second order logic where reduction is (theoretically) guaranteed. In any case, such approaches must cope with the undecidability of rst order logic, while LAP ; is decidable.
In the logic programming approaches, action theories and knowledge bases are encoded as logic programs. These programs are then queried in order to do prediction and planning. This framework induces several limitations w.r.t. the nature of the action theories and knowledge bases. In the GOLOG implementation presented in 35, 51] , action e ect laws and the elements of the knowledge base must be de nitional. This entails that there can be no disjunctions in e ect laws and in knowledge bases. While Reiter succeeds in representing actions with indeterminate e ects by means of nondeterministic actions that are implemented by macro expansion, the limitation of knowledge bases to de nitional ones appears to be severe in open domains with incomplete information, as noted by Reiter himself. Moreover, as logical negation is identi ed with negation by failure, the implementation of GOLOG in 35, 51] requires complete knowledge about the initial situation. For these reasons, such an implementation of GOLOG cannot handle correctly e.g. Sandewall's deaf turkey scenario.
Finally, the semantics of several action logics such as the A-family being in terms of nite state automata, it is a natural idea to apply to such structures model checking techniques (that are usually applied to prove properties of programs). As far as we know, the only place where this idea has been exploited is in 10].
LAP ; is based on tableau methods, and is not committed to the logic programming framework. It turned out that our stepback (SB) tableau rule can be generalized and successfully applied in order to de ne powerful modal tableaux, as we have recently demonstrated in 6]. The simplicity of our method supports our conviction that we can have an e cient implementation, e.g. taking pro t of existing SAT-algorithms for classical logic 23], or of sophisticated strategies 30]. We plan to do this in future work.
It is common to give priority to the simplicity of writing domain descriptions. In this sense, the best example is certainly the logic A of 19] . As said in section 9, extensions of A to indirect and indeterminate e ects of actions, while preserving this simplicity at the syntactic level, have a complex semantical machinery with builtin complete information hypotheses. In turn, we propose a simple language, with a clear semantics. We think that a simple framework is preferable, because we are much more immune against sophisticated toy examples which up to now successfully attacked most of the approaches that have been put forward { and we think the price to pay (viz. to write down indirect dependences, conditional frame axioms and executability laws) is not too high.
The generation of such information is one of the main themes of the second part of the paper (a rst draft may be found in 8]). 16 An important aspect treated there is that interaction with a designer of an action theory is fundamental and must be considered. Our logic is relatively weak, but it can be supplemented in a semiautomatic way: the designer can decide whether some dependences, e ect laws, and executability laws are the intended ones.
A Complexity: proofs Theorem 36 Complexity of LAP-satis ability is EXPTIME-complete.
The proof follows from the two lemmas below.
Lemma 37 Complexity of LAP-satis ability is at most EXPTIME. Proof We de ne a polynomialtransformation t from LAP into PDL (which is known to be in EXPTIME 17]). t recursively translates a given formula A 0 into t(A 0 ): t(p) = p for p 2 ATM t(2A) = ( 1 2 : : : n n+1 ) ]t(A), where 1 ; 2 ; : : :; n are the atomic actions occurring in A 0 , and n+1 is an atomic action not occurring in A 0 . and homomorphic else.
Clearly, t is a polynomial transformation.
Suppose that A 0 is LAP-valid. By completeness there is a LAP-proof of A 0 . We transform that proof into a PDL-proof of t(A 0 ). In order to do that it is su cient to establish that t preserves validity of the axioms and inference rules of LAP. Lemma 38 Complexity of LAP-satis ability is at least EXPTIME. Proof We transform the deduction problem of modal logic K (which is known to be EXPTIME-complete 26]) into the validity problem of LAP. Let The above is su cient for canonical models for Classical (non-modal) Propositional Calculus. For modal logics we need further de nitions and results.
Let S be a set of formulas of our language, we de ne 2 ? (S) to be the set fA: 2A 18 (i) By construction of we have that for every 2 ACT, R R 2 ; also by construction R 2 is re exive and transitive.
(ii) Let (n; n 0 ) 2 R . We show that if 6 ;P then n 6 2 (P) implies n 0 6 2 (P), and if 6 ;:P then n 2 (P) implies n 0 2 (P). Suppose 6 ;:P and n 2 (P). ) (n; p) 2 S by de nition of ; ) (n 0 ; p) 2 S (by rule SF); ) n 0 2 (P). Suppose 6 ;P and n 6 2 (P). ) (n; p) 6 2 S; ) (n 0 ; p) 6 2 S (otherwise (n; p) 2 S by rule SB); ) n 0 6 2 (P).
It remains to show that this model satis es A.
Lemma 46 Let B be a subformula of A: (*) if (n; B) 2 S then j = n B. Proof (By induction on the structure of B).
Induction initialization: let B be a literal then (*) holds by de nition of . Induction step: (We do not give the Boolean cases that are as usual.) 17 We recall that we make the usualfairness assumption: any rule that can be applied will eventually be applied. 18 In this and the following proofs, when we say \by rule R" we mean \by rule R and by the fairness assumption that rule R has been applied".
B is ]C, ]C 2 Br(n) ) (n 0 ; C) 2 S by rule (K ), for all n 0 such that (n; n 0 ) 2 = R ) j = n 0 C (by induction hypothesis), for all n 0 such that (n; n 0 ) 2 R = R ) j = n ]C.
B is 2C
First, (n; n 0 ) 2 R 2 ) (n; n 0 ) 2 ( ACT 2 ) ) 9n 0 = n; n 1 ; : : :; n k = n 0 such that (n i ; n i+1 ) 2 ACT 2 for 0 i < k. Now suppose (n; 2C) 2 S ) (n j ; 2C) 2 S for all 0 j k by successive applications of rule (4 2 ) ) (n 0 ; C) 2 S by rule (T 2 ) ) j = n 0 C (by induction hypothesis) ) j = n 2C. B is :2C (n; :2C) 2 S ) There exists n 0 such that (n; n 0 ) 2 R 2 , and (n 0 ; :C) 2 S (by rule 3) ) There exists n 0 such that (n; n 0 ) 2 R 2 , and j = n 0 :C (by induction hypothesis) ) j = n :2C. 
C.2 Soundness
In this subsection, we prove the soundness of our tableau calculus: if all tableaux for A are closed then A is unsatis able. To this end we rst state and prove a lemma.
De nition 49 Let S be a set of arbitrary labelled-formulas. A state S(n) denotes the set of formulas A such that (n; A) 2 S. Lemma 50 19 Let hS; i be a nite tree and let S(n) = S(n)^V 2ACT (n;n 0 )2 h iS(n 0 ) V (n;n 0 )2 2 3S(n 0 ). Then, for every rule: if for all possible C i+1 = f: : :; hS i+1 ; i+1 i; : : :g that can be obtained from C i = f: : :; hS i ; i i; : : :g 20 there exists n such that S i (n) is unsatis able, then so it is for C i .
Proof This lemma is proved by considering the various rules. (We only consider the cases of the rules 3 and h i, and SB. We will write j = instead of j = LAP ; ). 19 In this lemma, we identify a nite set of formulas with the conjunction of all its formulas, hence S also denotes the formula: V A2S A. 20 In fact, there is only one possibility, except in the case of rule _.
Rule 3: S i contains (3A; n), and applying rule 3 adds (n; n 0 ) to i 2 and (A; n 0 ) to S i . If all S i (n) were satis able, only S i+1 (n 0 ) might have become unsatis able: but we have S i+1 (n 0 ) = :A. Suppose :A is unsatis able: j = A, hence j = 2:A. Hence S i (n) is unsatis able too, since it contains 3A. The same reasoning applies straightforwardly to rule h i. Rule SB: S i contains (L; n 0 ), i contains (n; n 0 ), L is a literal and 6 ;L, and applying rule SB adds (L; n) to S i . Suppose S i+1 (n) = S i (n) fLg is unsatis able, then j = S i (n) ! :L. But 6 ;L implies j = :L ! ]:L; and (n; n 0 ) 2 , implies j = S i (n) ! : ]:S i (n 0 ), in particular: j = S i (n) ! : ]:L, and thus: j = S i (n) ! ]:L^neg ]:L, hence S i (n) is unsatis able. Theorem 51 If a tableau for A is closed then A is unsatis able. Proof The previous lemma ensures that all rules preserve LAP ; -satis ability. When transforming a forest into another one. Thus if A is LAP ; -satis able, we will start with an LAP ; -satis able forest fhf(A; 0)g; ;ig. Then, by the lemma, we cannot always obtain LAP ; -unsatis able trees when rules are applied, anda fortiori we cannot always obtain closed trees. there is at least one such w 0 (because 2h i> is in LAW ), and on the other hand, the interpretation v w 0 is equal to (v w ). 21 Hence 0( (v w )) = ; (vw) satis es L. Finally, the soundness and completeness theorem 27 follows directly from theorems 53 and 54.
